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INTRODUCTION
The Detroit Institute of Arts (DIA) is among the world’s most renowned 
museums.  Famous for its works by Diego Rivera, Vincent van Gogh, and Henri 
Matisse, the museum has been Detroit’s flagship cultural institution since the 
nineteenth century.1 But not long ago, the DIA’s continued existence was un-
certain.  During Detroit’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy, the City’s creditors sought a 
sale of the museum’s art to limit the losses that they would suffer upon dis-
charge of their claims.2 Creditors included not only bond insurers who stood to 
lose billions, but also tens of thousands of retirees who depended on the City for 
their healthcare and pension benefits.3 Detroit stood to lose its prized cultural 
institution, which the DIA’s supporters claimed would severely damage the 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, University of Michigan Law School.  Thank you Professor 
Carl Schneider, Nicholas Cagle, Jacob Muller, Abby Jacobs, and the staff of the Michigan Business 
& Entrepreneurial Law Review for your support and guidance.
1. NATHAN BOMEY, DETROIT RESURRECTED: TO BANKRUPTCY AND BACK 5 (2016).
2. Id. at 112, 116-17.
3. Mike Wilkinson, Here’s a Short List of the 8 Detroit Creditors Who Will Win and Lose 
the Most MICH. RADIO (Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/heres-short-list-8-
detroit-creditors-who-will-win-and-lose-most.
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City’s economy, reputation, and recovery.4 Michigan’s Attorney General was 
prepared to fight any sale of the artwork in court.5
Despite how fiercely this issue was debated in public, the bankruptcy court 
never reached this issue.  Fearing that the sale would damage Detroit’s pro-
spects, Detroit’s bankruptcy mediator, Judge Gerald Rosen, raised $816 million 
from corporate and non-profit donors to pay Detroit’s creditors.6 Had the bank-
ruptcy court decided whether to approve a liquidation of the DIA collection, the 
court would have shed light on the possibilities and limits of liquidation in 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy.  This Note assumes the $816 million rescue package 
never came, and uses the potential sale as a vehicle for exploring liquidation in 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy.  This Note concludes that a court should have ordered a 
partial sale of the DIA’s collection.  There is scant evidence that the museum 
was essential for Detroit’s future, and the collection was far too valuable to 
keep completely out of creditors’ hands—particularly given the fact that retiree 
creditors would have faced severe financial harm without a sale.  This Note 
does not evaluate the commonly floated legal and equitable arguments postulat-
ing that the art was held in some kind of trust, as there already exists plenty of 
literature dissecting that issue.
Part I of this Note provides background information that is helpful for un-
derstanding the Detroit bankruptcy, the role of the DIA in the bankruptcy, and 
municipal bankruptcies in general.  Part II evaluates equitable arguments 
against a sale of the DIA’s collection.  Part III provides a rationale for a partial 
sale of the DIA’s collection.
PART I: BACKGROUND
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
For decades, the City of Detroit owned the DIA, an unusual relationship be-
tween a city and a major museum.7 The Detroit Museum of Art (DMA) opened 
as a private institution in 1888, but quickly ran into financial trouble.8 In 1894, 
the City of Detroit agreed to subsidize the museum until a 1915 court decision 
4. See Mallika Rao, Detroit’s Art Sale Scare Reveals Better Options for Bankrupt City
HUFFINGTON POST (July 24, 2013, 10:11 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/detroit-art-sale-
bankruptcy_n_3643597.
5. Conveyance or Transfer of Detroit Institute of Arts Collection, Mich. Dept. of Att’y 
Gen., Op. 7272 (June 13, 2013), http://media.mlive.com/news/detroit_impact/other/
AGO%207272.pdf [hereinafter A.G. Schuette opinion].
6. Monica Davey, Finding $816 Million, and Fast, to Save Detroit N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/us/finding-816-million-and-fast-to-save-detroit.html.
7. See Philip Kennicott, Detroit Institute of Arts Fire Sale: The Worst Idea Out of Motor 
City Since the Edsel, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/
museums/detroit-institute-of-arts-fire-sale-the-worst-idea-out-of-motor-city-since-the-edsel/
2013/10/03/e95e842a-217b-11e3-b73c-aab60bf735d0_story.html.
8. BOMEY, supra note 1, at 113.
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declared this arrangement illegal under Michigan law.9 Hoping to protect the 
Detroit Museum of Art’s collection, the museum’s board of trustees arranged to 
transfer ownership of the collection to the City without conditions in 1919, and 
the Detroit-owned DMA became the DIA.10 As the center of the American auto 
industry, Detroit thrived during this period.  World War II brought Detroit more 
prosperity as the city became the center of wartime production.11 By the end of 
the war, Detroit had the highest paid blue-collar workers of any American 
city.12
This prosperity gradually evaporated over the second half of the twentieth 
century.  Beckoned by the prospect of larger properties, paranoid about a grow-
ing African-American population, and shepherded by an expanding highway 
system that facilitated longer commutes to work, Detroit’s white middle class 
began moving to the suburbs in the 1950s.13 Automobile production and related
manufacturing also shifted out of labor-friendly Detroit to rural areas without 
organized labor and to the suburban areas where middle-class workers were re-
locating.14 Making matters worse, slum clearance and the construction of inter-
state highways destroyed cohesive communities, removing the social support 
networks that many residents relied on.15 Racial tensions in the city boiled over 
in the summer of 1967 when African-American residents, infuriated by police 
abuses, rioted when police attempted to arrest, en masse, the patrons of an unli-
censed bar, there celebrating the return of two G.I.’s from the Vietnam War.  
The riots, including the heavy-handed response by police, only exacerbated 
white flight.16 As Detroit’s economy shrank and as its population became poor-
er, crime rose and drove even more people out.17 Between 1950 and 2010, De-
troit lost 1.1 million residents, roughly two-thirds of its population.18 Mean-
while, the DIA remained housed in its grandiose Beaux-Arts walls as a draw for 
suburban visitors.
9. Detroit Museum of Art v. Engel, 187 Mich. 432, 439 (1915).
10. BOMEY, supra note 1, at 115.
11. Gerald Scott, Detroit’s war effort went well beyond the vehicles CHICAGO TRIBUNE
(Dec. 9, 2001), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2001-12-09-0112090415-story.html.
12. THOMAS J. SUGRUE, ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS 3 (1996).
13. Id. at 245.
14. Id. at 127-28.
15. Id. at 48-49.
16. See id. at 265-66.
17. See BOMEY, supra note 1, at 3.
18. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950, CENSUS 
TRACT STATISTICS: DETROIT MICHIGAN AND ADJACENT AREA 7 (1952), https://www2.census.gov/
library/publications/decennial/1950/population-volume-3/41557421v3p2ch02.pdf; U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, QUICKFACTS: DETROIT CITY, MICHIGAN, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/
detroitcitymichigan/PST120218 (last visited May 9, 2019).
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The City’s finances suffered but remained well managed during the second 
half of the twentieth century.19 Property values “plummeted from $45.2 billion 
in 1958 to $9.6 billion in 2012,”20 which sharply reduced tax revenues.  During 
his twenty-year mayoralty from 1974 to 1994, Coleman Young responded to 
falling revenue by deeply cutting the City’s budget.  These cuts allowed Mayor 
Young to keep Detroit’s budget mostly balanced.21 His successor, Mayor Den-
nis Archer also maintained a balanced budget and a solvent pension system.22
The City’s budget cuts included its support of the DIA.  Detroit ceased contrib-
uting to the museum’s coffers in 1955.23 Still, the City of Detroit owned the 
museum, making the art collection an asset of the City.
Detroit’s finances became dangerously strained during the mid-2000s under 
Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick.  In 2004, bad investments led to a $1.7 billion short-
fall in pension funding.24  In response, the City issued $1.44 billion in bonds 
through a convoluted scheme designed to skirt legal limits on the City’s obliga-
tions.25  When the Great Recession caused Detroit’s property tax revenues to 
further decline, the City defaulted on the loans.26 This default triggered a $400 
million “termination payment,” which could have forced Detroit into bankrupt-
cy but for Detroit’s pledge to compensate creditors with tax revenue from its 
casinos.27
In the years after the recession, dwindling tax revenue and growing finan-
cial obligations racked the City’s ability to provide basic services.  Quality-of-
life services were completely neglected: large swaths of Detroit were without 
working streetlights, abandoned buildings were allowed to remain standing, and 
parks went without maintenance.28 Emergency services were dangerously 
strained, with police response times reaching up to half an hour.29 This crisis 
brought Detroit to a breaking point.  On July 18, 2013, the City of Detroit filed 
for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection.30 Naturally, Detroit’s creditors demanded 
repayment and turned to one of the City’s most valuable unencumbered assets, 
the DIA.
19. See id. at 18-19; Archer, Dennis, DET. HIST. SOC’Y, https://detroithistorical.org/
learn/encyclopedia-of-detroit/archer-dennis (last visited May 6, 2019).
20. BOMEY, supra note 1, at 18-19.
21. Id. at 2.
22. DET. HIST. SOC’Y, supra note 19.
23. Liam Sweeney & Katherine Daniel, Becoming a Public Square: Detroit Institute of Arts
4 (2018), https://sr.ithaka.org/publications/becoming-a-public-square-detroit-institute-of-arts/.
24. BOMEY, supra note 1, at 22.
25. Id. at 23-24.
26. Id. at 27.
27. Id. at 27-28.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
30. Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles into Insol-
vency, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-
bankruptcy.html.
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B. CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY
i. History & Mechanisms
Cities seeking bankruptcy protection are forced to file under Chapter 9 of 
the bankruptcy code,31 which Congress created in 1934.32 Before Congress 
added Chapter 9, creditors of municipal governments sought writs of mandamus 
forcing municipal governments to raise taxes in order to service debt.33 During 
the Great Depression, this proved impractical because the country’s economic 
malaise made raising tax revenue “useless,” as the Supreme Court stated.34
Since 1937, 680 municipalities have gone bankrupt, and over 40 of these bank-
ruptcies have been filed since the Great Recession.35
Today, Chapter 9’s protections are modeled after the provisions of Chapter 
11, which governs the restructuring of business debts36 and allows business 
debtors to continue operating.37 This is material to understanding the function 
of Chapter 9; fundamentally, municipal bankruptcy is about keeping the munic-
ipality “alive.”38 Unlike Chapter 7, which liquidates consumer and business 
debtors, Chapter 11 bankruptcy allows a debtor to restructure its debt so the 
debtor will be financially solvent post-bankruptcy.39 Furthermore, Chapter 11 
often functions as a negotiation between a debtor and its creditors over the spe-
cific provisions of the restructuring, known as the “bankruptcy plan.”40 While 
the Code’s stay on debt collection and a bankruptcy court’s “cram down” provi-
sion provide the debtors with leverage,41 creditors also have leverage because 
their approval of a plan is necessary.42 This balance of power is a key compo-
nent of the negotiation and collaboration that Congress intended to be part of a 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy. “[C]hapter 9 provides essentially for federal court protec-
31. See 11 U.S.C. §109(c) (2018).
32. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934) (current version at 11 
U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (2018)).
33. Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 534 (1936) (Cardozo, 
J., dissenting).
34. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 53-54 (1938).
35. James Spiotto with Jeff Garceau, Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy Statistics: Use by 
Number, Type and Year, MUNINET GUIDE (June 14, 2018), https://muninetguide.com/municipal-
bankruptcy-statistics/.
36. Sometimes consumers file under Chapter 11. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 
(1991).
37. See 11 U.S.C. 901.
38. See Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3
(2005).
39. Id. at 359.
40. Id. at 365.
41. “Cram down” refers to the ability of a bankruptcy court to force recalcitrant creditors to 
accept a restructuring plan. See 11 U.S.C. 1129(b).
42. See 11 U.S.C. 1126.
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tion, and supervision of a settlement between the debtor municipality and a ma-
jority of its creditors.”43
ii. Liquidation of Assets in Chapter 9
A sale of the DIA collection would have liquidated a portion of Detroit’s
assets.  Although Chapter 9 is intended to restructure the debt of a municipality 
rather than liquidate its assets, the Code permits limited liquidation of municipal 
debtors, as Chapter 9 incorporates 11 U.S.C. 1123(b)(4), which allows for the 
liquidation of assets in a restructuring plan.  A municipality can volunteer to 
liquidate its possessions in a Chapter 9 bankruptcy.44 The only limit on liquida-
tion in Chapter 9, it seems, is that the local government must retain enough as-
sets to continue functioning.45
A key difference between Chapters 9 and 11 is that “[i]n chapter 9, no liq-
uidation alternative exists. . . . the only alternative to a debtor’s plan is dismissal 
and resort to largely ineffective state remedies.”46 Chapter 11 bankruptcies can 
be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation case if a court determines that a debtor 
is unlikely to successfully reorganize under Chapter 11.47 In contrast, Congress 
denied the possibility of a liquidation bankruptcy for municipalities.  As the 
House of Representatives’ report on amendments to the Code noted, “A munic-
ipal unit cannot liquidate its assets to satisfy its creditors totally and finally. 
Therefore, the primary purpose of Chapter 9 is to allow the municipal unit to 
continue operating while it adjusts or refinances creditor claims with minimum 
(and in many cases, no) loss to its creditors.”48 In other words, Congress would 
prioritize preserving the vitality of a municipality, sufficient for its continued 
operation as a government entity.
Underscoring Congress’ intent to prohibit large-scale liquidation of munici-
pal assets, section 904(3) of the Code provides substantial protection to property 
owned by municipalities. As one bankruptcy court wrote:
In the overall construct, § 904 . . . is so comprehensive that it can only mean that a 
federal court can use no tool in its toolkit — no inherent authority power, no im-
plied equitable power, no Bankruptcy Code § 105 power, no writ, no stay, no order 
— to interfere with a municipality regarding political or governmental powers, 
property or revenues, or use or enjoyment of income-producing property. As a 
practical matter, the § 904 restriction functions as an anti-injunction statute — and 
more.
49
43. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 263 (1977).
44. 11 U.S.C. 901 (2012); see also 11 U.S.C. 1123(a)(5) (2012).
45. See H.R. REP 95-595, at 263 (1978).
46. Laura N. Coordes, Formalizing Chapter 9’s Experts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1249, 1257
(2018).
47. See 11 U.S.C. 1112(b) (2012).
48. H.R. REP 95-595, at 263.
49. In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 20 (E.D. Cal. Bankr. 2012) (citations omitted).
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In other words, a court cannot order a liquidation.  Instead, liquidation is only 
possible if a debtor municipality consents to selling its assets.
Of course, the protection of 904(3) is limited by the pressure that a unified 
coalition of creditors can place on a municipality and the Court.50 Namely, 
creditors may withhold their votes to approve a Chapter 9 plan,51 which is how 
creditors convinced Kevyn Orr to consent to a liquidation of the DIA’s art-
work.52
PART II: ECONOMIC EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS
A readjustment plan must meet the “fair and equitable” requirement of the 
Code in order to be confirmed by a bankruptcy court.53 “In a Chapter 9 case, 
the fair and equitable requirement has been interpreted to mean that Holders of 
Claims must receive all they can reasonably expect under the circumstances of 
the Case.”54 The “fair and equitable” standard differs between Chapters 11 and 
9:
Under Chapter 11, a plan of reorganization is “fair and equitable” with respect to 
secured creditors if such creditors (1) retain their liens on their prepetition collateral 
and receive deferred payments on account of their claims; (2) are given the right to 
credit bid their claims if their collateral is sold free and clean of their liens and have 
those liens attach to the proceeds of such sale; or (3) receive the indubitable equiva-
lent of their claims.
55
In contrast, “the plan is ‘fair and equitable’ in Chapter 9 if the amount to be re-
ceived by the bondholders is all that they can reasonably expect in the circum-
stances.”56 In Chapter 9, the “fair and equitable” requirement is better de-
scribed as a “reasonable expectations” requirement, a more liberal standard than 
Chapter 11’s requirement.57 The ability of a municipality to continue providing 
services to its residents and to emerge solvent from its bankruptcy limits credi-
tors’ reasonable expectations.  Essentially, for a Chapter 9 plan to be “fair and 
equitable,” the plan must be fair and equitable to both the creditors and the 
debtor.
Opponents of the sale frequently argued that the DIA was of substantial 
economic value to Detroit, and that this economic value outweighed the liquida-
50. BOMEY, supra note 1, at 134.
51. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901, 943, 1126, 1129.
52. See BOMEY, supra note 1, at 117-18.
53. 11 U.S.C. 901(a); 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(1).
54. In re Hardeman Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 540 B.R. 229, 239 (2015).
55. JOHN J. RAPISARDI ET AL., CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES:
A BIG STICK RARELY USED 6 (2011), https://www.cadwalader.com/uploads/books/
93f1695e93f36727586428ff06bf27ba.pdf; see also 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(A), (B).
56. RAPISARDI ET AL., supra note 55, at 8 (quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
57. Oral Opinion on the Record of Judge Rhodes at 31, In re City of Detroit Bankr., No. 13-
53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.scribd.com/doc/245864897/Oral-Opinion-on-
Detroit-Plan-Confirmation-Judge-Rhodes-FINAL-for-Release.
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tion value of the artwork.58 The DIA, opponents claimed, was necessary to 
keeping Detroit alive.  This argument was unsupported by economic data and 
also ignored possible compromises.  Overall, the different measures of the 
DIA’s value supported a sale of the artwork, although as this Note will later ar-
gue, other considerations justified limiting the sale.
A. VALUING THE ARTWORK
Valuing the DIA’s collection is essential to an analysis of the economic ar-
guments for saving the DIA, because it is necessary to understand what the City 
of Detroit had to lose and what its creditors had to gain.  Practical considera-
tions rather than established legal principles determine valuations.59 There are 
some established methods for valuing property, but these vary among different 
bankruptcy courts.60 In practice, valuation in bankruptcy is a “quagmire.”61
Many different measures can represent monetary value.  This section ex-
plores three measures—going concern value, liquidation value, and economic 
value—and assesses the value of the DIA’s collection under each measurement.  
Each measure provides a different angle to analyze the impact of a sale of the 
collection upon Detroit. I also explore the “immeasurable” value of the muse-
um for Detroit.
i. Going Concern Value
Going concern value is the value of a business as an income producing enti-
ty.62 Generally speaking, “[g]oing concern values generally exceed liquidation 
values.  There are, however, exceptions,” such as a business with a net operat-
ing loss.63 When a business depends on its property, like the DIA on its collec-
tion, an approach called “income capitalization” can represent the business’s 
going concern value.  The income capitalization approach “determines market 
value by examining the actual income versus the operating expenses of the 
58. See, e.g., Nora Caplan-Bricker, Detroit’s Art Is Worth More in the Museum than Out,
NEW REPUBLIC (July 22, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/113979/detroits-art-worth-more-
museum-out.
59. See Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Valuation Disputes in Corporate Bankrupt-
cy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1824-25 (2018).
60. See id.
61. Anthony J. Casey & Julia Simon-Kerr, A Simple Theory of Complex Valuation, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2015).
62. Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV.
1061, 1063 (1985).
63. Id. at 1064.
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property.”64 The net operating income is then divided by a capitalization rate, 
which then results in the income capitalization.65
Courts typically consider a property’s income capitalization when calculat-
ing the value of collateral for secured creditors.  For example, if a hotel property 
is mortgaged, the value of the hotel property may be best determined not by the 
value of the land, but rather, by how much income the hotel can generate.66 Of 
course, the DIA’s collection was not real property. However, like real property, 
the collection had a rental value.  Visitors paid to see the collection similar to 
how tenants pay to reside on a rental property.  In the case of the DIA, income 
capitalization could theoretically provide a justification for blocking the liquida-
tion of the museum’s collection.  Alternatively, it could have been sold by the 
City to a private operator for a price based on income capitalization.
Unfortunately, the DIA only brought in about $10 million per year in reve-
nue at the time of Detroit’s bankruptcy.67 This was far from covering its $25 
million budget,68 most of which was covered by the millage paid by residents of 
Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne counties.69 This means that the DIA had a nega-
tive net operating income and in turn no income capitalization leading up to the 
Detroit bankruptcy.  Because the museum had no income capitalization, it 
would have been worth little if it were marketed as an attraction to private oper-
ators.
ii.  Liquidation Value
Were the DIA collection auctioned off, the proceeds derived from the auc-
tion would represent the collection’s “liquidation value.” The liquidation value 
of the collection was estimated to be between $1.1 billion and $8.1 billion by 
three different appraisals.70 Christie’s auction house, which Kevyn Orr com-
missioned to value works purchased by the City, valued the DIA’s city-
purchased artwork between $454 million and $867 million; this represented the 
liquidation value of only about 5% of the artwork.71 A handful of pieces, how-
64. Whitehouse Condo. Group, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 959 F. Supp. 2d 1024, n. 1 (E.D. 
Mich., 2013).
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., In re Buena Vista Oceanside, 479 B.R. 342 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2012).
67. Caplan-Bricker, supra note 58.
68. Jennifer Guerra, Detroit Institute of Arts Uses Restricted Funds to Cover Operating 
Costs, MICHIGAN RADIO (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.michiganradio.org/post/detroit-institute-arts-
uses-restricted-funds-cover-operating-costs.
69. See Millage Details, DETROIT INSTITUTE OF ART, https://www.dia.org/visit/millage-
details (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).
70. See generally Expert Witness Report of Michael Plummer, In re City of Detroit, 524 
B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) [hereinafter Artvest Report] (No. 13-53846), 
https://app.box.com/s/6wmjw6qve42c99tta48c (last visited May 9, 2019) (for two appraisals); Ex-
pert Witness Report of Victor Wiener, In re City of Detroit, 542 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) 
(No. 13-53846) [hereinafter Wiener Report].
71. See BOMEY, supra note 1, at 127-28.
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ever, represented seventy-five percent of the value of the DIA’s collection.72
Pieter Bruegel’s The Wedding Dance, for instance, was valued between $100 
million and $200 million.73 Van Gogh’s Self-Portrait with Straw Hat was 
worth between $80 million and $150 million.74
Lower estimates assumed that any of the liquidated artwork would be con-
sidered tainted by the art world and that the risk purchasing DIA artwork posed 
to purchasers’ reputations would lower the price.75 Indeed, “a prized painting is 
not worth anything until you convince someone to buy it.”76 Another issue that 
impacted some estimates was that the open market would be flooded with so 
much art at one time.77
Artvest, a financial advisory firm specializing in the art market, noted in an 
expert witness report that a then-recent auction of Impressionist and Modern 
paintings similar to the DIA’s most valuable pieces sold for less than ex-
pected.78 Around the time of the Detroit bankruptcy, the art market’s prices had 
“plateaued,” according to Artvest, and “[i]n such a market where prices and 
sales volumes are not appreciating quickly, selling at or below the low estimate 
is more the norm, and selling at the higher end of the estimate range becomes an 
anomaly.”79  Artvest was retained by the DIA80 and surmised that the DIA’s 
collection could fetch as little as $1.1 billion to $1.8 billion in a fire sale.81 In a 
less hurried sale, Artvest estimated the collection could yield $2.8 billion to 
$4.6 billion.82
Victor Wiener Associates (VWA), which was contracted by one of Detroit’s
largest creditors to appraise the DIA’s collection, valued the artwork at $8.1 bil-
lion.83 This report, valuing the DIA’s tens of thousands of pieces, was complet-
ed in fourteen days.84 VWA admitted this time span amounted to “highly limit-
ing conditions.”85 In reaching its valuation, VWA assumed that the auction of 
72. Id. at 127.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Artvest Report at 29.
76. BOMEY, supra note 1, at 127.
77. See id. at 171.
78. Artvest Report at 8-9.
79. Id. at 9.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id. at 37.
82. BOMEY, supra note 1, at 171.
83. Weiner Report at 3.
84. City of Detroit’s Motion to Exclude Testimony of Victor Wiener at 1, In re City of De-
troit, 542 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 13-53846), http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/detroit/docket7000.pdf.
85. Wiener Report, supra note 70, at 18.
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the artwork would not be tainted, and would instead be akin to a “celebrity 
sale.”86
The VWA could not have been thorough in assessing each piece of the 
DIA’s collection, and its assumption that the artwork would fetch a higher value 
by virtue of having been part of the DIA collection runs counter to almost uni-
versally followed rules against museum deaccessioning.87 Because deacces-
sioning is so controversial,88 it is extremely unlikely that an auction of the DIA 
collection would have taken on the aura of a celebrity sale.  Instead, it would 
have been more likely that the art would sell for prices that reflected the tainted 
nature of the sale.  “[M]ajor U.S. museums almost certainly would have refused 
to bid to avoid upsetting industry standards, risking their accreditation status, 
and triggering a publicity crisis.”89 And while private buyers would not have 
been constrained by similar ethical considerations, the demand of private buy-
ers, who often have an interest in eventually donating their collectables, could 
still have been curbed by anti-deaccessioning rules because museums would not 
accept donations of pieces that were once part of the DIA collection.
In addition to anti-deaccessioning rules depressing the prices of the DIA 
collection, in general, bankruptcy sales tend to destroy value, while reorganiza-
tions retain more value.  As one study found in the context of selling businesses 
that filed for Chapter 11:
[We] compared the prices for which thirty large public companies were sold with 
the values of thirty similar companies that were reorganized in the period 2000 
through 2004. We found that companies sold for an average of 35% of book value 
but reorganized for an average market capitalization value—based on post-
reorganization stock trading—of 91% of book value. Even controlling for the dif-
ferences in the prefiling earnings of the two sets of companies, sale yielded less 
than half as much value as reorganization.
In nearly every instance, the sales we examined were “market-tested” by pub-
lic auction. . . . We interpret the data as showing that the high costs of evaluating 
companies, combined with the low probability of success for competing bidders, 
discourages competitive bids . . . .
90
Artwork auctions suffer from similar informational issues and disincentives.  
Appraising artwork is expensive and bidders at public art auctions have a low 
probability of placing a successful bid.  Thus, the liquidation value of the DIA’s 
86. Typically, this refers to the sale of a famous person’s art collection. Id. at 27.
87. See generally ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS, AAMD POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING
(2010), https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/AAMD%20Policy%20on%20Deaccessioning
%20website_0.pdf (amended Oct. 2015). “Deaccessioning” refers to “the process by which a work 
of art or other object (collectively, a “work”), wholly or in part, is permanently removed from a mu-
seum’s collection.” Id at 2.
88. See, e.g., David R. Gabor, Deaccessioning Fine Art Works: A Proposal for Heightened 
Scrutiny, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1005, 1005-06 (1989).
89. BOMEY, supra note 1, at 127.
90. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-
5 (2007) (footnote omitted).
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art is likely on the lower end of the appraisals.  But creditors would not neces-
sarily be in a rush to sell the artwork and could put pieces on the auction block 
over a longer period of time than they would in a fire sale.  Given these consid-
erations, a valuation similar to Artvest’s higher appraisal was probably most ac-
curate.
Overall, a lower valuation would have been good news for the DIA because
the less the collection was worth, the more likely the collection’s economic val-
ue to Detroit would outweigh the collection’s liquidation value.  In turn, a sale 
would not be as justified.
iii.  The Collection’s Economic Value
Judge Steven Rhodes, Detroit’s bankruptcy judge, indicated a willingness 
not to permit a sale of the DIA collection because of the collection’s impact on 
Detroit’s economy.  In his opinion approving Detroit’s actual bankruptcy plan, 
Rhodes stated that “[t]o sell the DIA art would only deepen Detroit’s fiscal, 
economic, and social problems. To sell the DIA art would be to forfeit Detroit’s
future.”91
Unfortunately, there is no report or study describing the DIA’s economic 
impact on Detroit, but there are data points that one can use to draw inferences 
about the DIA’s economic impact.  Specifically:
• The DIA had a budget of $25.4 million.92
• In 2014, while the Detroit bankruptcy was still ongoing, cultural-
heritage-related activity, including art museums, generated over $59 mil-
lion in wages in the Detroit region.
93
• The DIA was one of sixty-four cultural heritage institutions in Detroit, 
which employed a total of 2,026 people in Detroit.
94
• The DIA had about 600,000 visitors annually.95
There is data on the multiplier effect, or the total economic output resulting 
from economic activity, for arts spending nationally.96 Yet this would be un-
91. BOMEY, supra note 1, at 238.
92. Patricia Cohen, Suburban Taxpayers Vote to Support Detroit Museum N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
8, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/arts/design/detroit-institute-of-arts-county-millage-
tax-approved.html.




95. Randy Kennedy & Monica Davey, Detroit’s Creditors Eye Its Art Collection, N.Y.
TIMES (July 19, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/arts/design/detroits-creditors-eye-its-
art-collection.html.
96. E.g., Josh Bivens, Updated employment multipliers for the U.S. economy, ECON. POLICY
INST. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.epi.org/publication/updated-employment-multipliers-for-the-u-s-
economy/.
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helpful for analyzing the economic value of the DIA, as the multiplier effect for 
spending on the arts in Detroit is likely smaller compared to other American cit-
ies.  In contrast to cities like New York or Boston, Detroit has fewer restaurants 
and retail stores that museum visitors could patronize after visiting the DIA.  
The smaller multiplier effect in Detroit limits the economic impact of the DIA.  
A precise figure representing the DIA’s economic value to Detroit cannot be 
calculated absent more information, although the impact is likely insignificant 
given the small budget and diminished multiplier effect.
iv. Immeasurable Economic Value
DIA supporters also often cited the immeasurable value of the DIA to De-
troit as a reason to prevent a sale of the museum’s collection.97 The two con-
cerns detailed below both could have harmed Detroit’s economy, making its re-
covery from bankruptcy more challenging.  In turn, a court should have given 
meaningful weight to these concern in evaluating whether to allow a sale or to 
allow a limited sale of the DIA’s artwork.
The museum’s impact on the prestige of the city is one important immeas-
urable economic consideration.  Prestige is important to a municipality because 
“[m]any cities consciously engage in what has become known as place market-
ing, which involves striving to sell the image of a place so as to make it more 
attractive to businesses, tourists, and inhabitants.”98 A city’s reputation can at-
tract or repel business.99  Were Detroit to lose the DIA, the City’s reputation 
could be damaged, which in turn could have a repulsive influence on firms from 
all sectors of the economy.  Around the time of its bankruptcy, Detroit’s reputa-
tion could hardly have gotten worse.  Nevertheless, like Chapter 11, underlying 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy is the idea that a municipal debtor should be positioned 
by a court to succeed after bankruptcy.  Therefore, a court should have consid-
ered how preserving the DIA could provide Detroit a better opportunity to im-
prove its reputation post-bankruptcy.
Additionally, “clustering” is an important component of the “creative econ-
omy.”  Creative firms and institutions attract other creative firms and institu-
tions by allowing collaboration between firms and by reducing costs.100  Fur-
ther, investments in the creative sector tend to be relatively high-risk ventures.  
Diversification and collaboration are necessary in this field:
[I]n the last several decades, we have witnessed an increasing “commodification”
of cultural goods, which allows culture from punk to hip-hop to be sold in a global 
97. E.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 167.
98. John Crompton, Beyond Economic Impact: An Alternate Rationale for the Public Subsi-
dy of Major League Sports Facilities, 18 J. SPORT MGMT. 40, 44 (2004).
99. Peter Jakub & Eva Happ, Impact Assessment between the City and the Company Reputa-
tion, 10 ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY 279, 279 (2017).
100. Allen J. Scott, Cultural Economy and the Creative Field of the City, 92 GEOGRAFISKA 
ANNALER 115, 117 (2010).
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marketplace. But in this commodification process, creative industries and creative 
producers must engage each other and generate new products together on some part 
for survival, because creative goods are risky and inherently attract fickle consumer 
tastes . . . [T]he more people, firms, and industries able to participate in producing a 
particular good, the more diffused the risk. These dynamics emerge as a result of 
the taste-driven, uncertain nature of the cultural economy.
101
Without the DIA, collaboration could become more challenging in Detroit’s 
creative sector as there would be fewer creative individuals in the area to con-
sult about proposed creative ventures.  The demise of the DIA could weaken the 
creative sector activity around Detroit, which in turn could discourage other 
firms in the creative sector from clustering into Detroit.
B. WHAT TO MAKE OF THE COLLECTION’S VALUE
While liquidation sales generally destroy the value of a debtor’s property, 
the DIA artwork also had relatively little demonstrable economic value to De-
troit.  As an asset of the City, the DIA was a money-loser and had an income 
capitalization of zero.  While determining the museum’s economic impact on 
Detroit with certainty is a task beyond the scope of this Note, the data available 
suggest that the DIA was likely worth more on the auction block than it was as 
an asset to the City and as part of Detroit’s economy.
Not liquidating the art, in fact, could have had a negative impact on De-
troit’s economy and government—and perhaps a more severe impact than the 
DIA’s demise.  Detroit’s creditors were not only bond insurers and contractors, 
but also retired public employees.  One attorney involved in the bankruptcy de-
scribed the tension as “Pills over Picasso.”102 Denying retirees the opportunity 
to extract any value from the DIA would have resulted in slashed pension pay-
outs and healthcare benefits for retirees.  This would force retirees, many of 
whom still lived in Detroit and southeast Michigan, to reduce their spending.  
For some retirees, “quality of care in assisted living centers and nursing homes 
was directly correlated with their monthly income.”103 Ultimately, cuts to retir-
ees’ pension and healthcare benefits would have adversely impacted businesses 
that relied on retirees’ spending, and as a result the City of Detroit would see 
reduced tax revenue.
i. The Possibility of a Partial Liquidation
Liquidating the DIA’s artwork might not have meant the demise of the mu-
seum.  As one staffer to Kevyn Orr wrote, “[I]f [the DIA’s benefactors] don’t
like it . . . [t]hey can buy the art and gift it back to the DIA.”104 Given the pub-
101. ELIZABETH CURRID, THE WARHOL ECONOMY: HOW FASHION, ART, AND MUSIC DRIVE 
NEW YORK CITY 115 (2007).
102. BOMEY, supra note 1, at 123.
103. Id. at 155.
104. Id. at 123.
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lic outcry in reaction to the possible sale of the DIA’s artwork, purchasing and 
regifting auctioned DIA pieces could have become a cause célèbre for philan-
thropists.  This task would have been more feasible if only the most valuable 
paintings were auctioned, as there would have been fewer opportunities for the 
DIA’s benefactors to be outbid by buyers uninterested saving the DIA.  In this 
ideal scenario, proceeds from the sale would go to retirees’ pensions and 
healthcare benefits, while the economic benefit of the museum to the City 
would have been preserved.
ii. The Possibility of Sharing Liquidation Proceeds to 
Replace the DIA’s Economic Impact
A sale of the DIA’s artwork could have generated enough revenue both to 
repay creditors a significant sum and to theoretically provide principal for the 
City to invest and generate returns equal to the museum’s economic impact.  
For example, if the artwork were worth $2.8 billion at auction, as Artvest con-
servatively appraised, and if the museum had a $20 million annual economic 
impact on Detroit, Detroit would then keep $500 million of the proceeds of the 
sale.  The $500 million sum would produce $20 million per year in investment 
returns, assuming a four percent rate of return.
In Chapter 7 liquidations, debtors are always able to keep some of their as-
sets up to a certain value.  What a Chapter 7 debtor keeps is called an “exemp-
tion,” which is related to the “fresh start” principle.  “To help the debtor obtain 
a fresh start, [the Code] permits him to withdraw from the estate certain inter-
ests in property, such as his car or home, up to certain values.”105 If the value of 
an asset exceeds an exemption limit, the asset is considered “partially ex-
empt.”106 The concept of Detroit “exempting” a portion of the liquidation reve-
nue is a similar concept, although seemingly unprecedented in Chapter 9 bank-
ruptcy.  Formally speaking, the Code’s provisions governing exemptions are not 
incorporated into Chapter 9 bankruptcy.107 But because Chapter 9 readjustment 
plans are negotiated, Detroit’s plan still could have split the proceeds of liqui-
dating the DIA’s collection. Treating the proceeds of the DIA’s liquidation as 
property subject to an “exemption” by sharing auction proceeds would have 
balanced the need to repay creditors with the “fresh start” principle by allocat-
ing a nine or ten-figure sum toward creditor repayment while enabling Detroit 
to replace the economic output that the museum generated with investment in-
come.
105. Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 325 (2005).
106. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Issues of the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 94 Cong. 27 (1976) (Statement of William T. 
Plumb, Jr.).
107. See 11 U.S.C. §901 (2012).
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PART III: HOW A COURT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED THE ISSUE
Ultimately, a court should have decided to allow a partial sale of the collec-
tion—to allow some, but not all of the DIA’s most valuable pieces and artwork 
held in storage to be sold.  This could have raised hundreds of millions, if not 
billions, to repay creditors, while leaving enough of the DIA intact to continue 
as a cultural beacon for Detroit.
A. THE NEED TO LIQUIDATE
The liquidation value of the DIA’s collection was simply too valuable to 
leave the collection untouched, and the going concern value of the collection 
was too small to justify saving the museum.  Although the liquidation value of 
the museum is unknowable, the museum made only a modest amount of money 
in ticket sales and the liquidation value was very likely far greater than the val-
ue of the collection as an income-producing asset.  The museum, in fact, was a 
money-loser that relied on taxpayer dollars and donations to survive.
While defenders of the museum cited the immeasurable economic and cul-
tural impact of the DIA on Detroit, the economic and human impact of failing to 
repay the City’s retirees would also have been severe—and measurable.  Nearly 
32,000 former city employees, including disabled former policemen and fire-
men would have been affected.108 The quality of life that these retirees could 
afford was at stake.  Even following the actual plan, under which $816 million 
was raised to save the museum and compensate creditors, retirees have had their 
benefits reduced and some struggle to make ends meet as a result.109
B. THE FRESH START IN BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 9 emphasizes the “fresh start” principle undergirding legal thought 
surrounding bankruptcy.  Although usually discussed in the context of consum-
er bankruptcy, the concept can be applied to other forms of bankruptcy.110 “The 
fresh start philosophy places the cost of a borrower’s failure on his lend-
ers . . .”111 By punishing creditors, bankruptcy:
. . . not only provides lenders with incentives to charge borrowers for the cost of 
failure (in the form of higher interest rates), but also provides incentives for lenders 
108. See Susan Tompor, Even 5 Years Later, Retirees Feel the Effects of Detroit’s Bankrupt-
cy, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 18, 2018), https://www.freep.com/story/money/personal-
finance/susan-tompor/2018/07/18/detroit-bankruptcy-retirees-pension/759446002/.
109. Id.
110. See Jonathan S. Hermann, Restoring Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.
189, 194 (2017).
111. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, New Value, Fresh Start, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 125, 160 
(1997).
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to counteract adverse selection and moral hazard problems by filtering out uncre-
ditworthy borrowers and by monitoring the performance of existing borrowers.
112
While some may balk at the idea of a government entity skirting its financial 
obligations, forcing borrowers to bear the risk of a municipal bankruptcy in the-
ory discourages predatory lending to mismanaged municipalities.  Likewise, 
forcing Detroit’s lenders to bear the burden of its financial failure discourages 
the granting of high-risk, high-interest loans to struggling cities moving for-
ward.
One key difference between Chapters 9 and 11 that Congress has recog-
nized is that “a municipality is generally not a business enterprise operating for 
profit, and there are no stockholders.”113 As Justice Sonia Sotomayor recently 
noted, “[w]hile a business corporation can use bankruptcy to reorganize, and, if 
that fails, fold up shop and liquidate all of its assets, governments cannot shut 
down power plants, water, hospitals, sewers, and trains and leave citizens to 
fend for themselves.”114 This suggests Congress recognizes that Chapter 9 may 
weigh more on the side of providing a debtor municipality with relief as com-
pared to a business debtor in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. “[U]nlike the other 
Chapters, Chapter 9 does not attempt to balance the rights of the debtor and its 
creditors, but rather, to meet the special needs of a municipal debtor.”115
C. THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPROMISE
Lost in the public debate over the potential sale of the DIA art was the pos-
sibility of a compromise over the fate of the museum.  Neither did a sale need to 
involve all of the art, nor did all of the proceeds of such a sale need to go entire-
ly to creditors.  “Chapter 11 is sometimes described as an invitation to a negoti-
ation.”116 As the municipal form of Chapter 11, Chapter 9 can be characterized 
the same way, and the $816 million fundraising plan that saved the DIA from 
the auction block was the result of a negotiation.  A compromise could have 
balanced the need to compensate creditors with the need to give Detroit a shot 
at a “fresh start” by minimizing whatever harm could befall Detroit as a result 
of auctioning all or part of the DIA’s collection.
Although the City of Detroit could have received part of the proceeds of an 
auction of the entire collection, liquidating the entire museum was likely unnec-
essary and risked harming Detroit’s economy in the long run; a complete liqui-
dation of the DIA would have been antithetical to the “fresh start” principle.  
The complete loss of the DIA would have risked damaging Detroit’s creative 
112. Id.
113. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 263 (1977).
114. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1950 (2016) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
115. In re Richmond Unified School Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 225 (1991).
116. In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 486 B.R. 286, 297 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013) (emphasis 
added).
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sector, hurt the City’s reputation, and left the City deeply humiliated.  While the 
risk of harm would have been difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate, the 
spirit of Chapter 9 would have afforded that risk great weight.  Additionally, the 
portion of auction proceeds that would be allocated to the City of Detroit in or-
der to produce dividends equivalent to the museum’s economic value117 would 
likely have deprived creditors of a sum of money unacceptable to creditors.  
And seventy-five percent of the value of the DIA’s collection was concentrated 
in a handful of pieces, meaning that creditors would derive the bulk of their 
compensation from a small portion of the collection.  Therefore, the vast ma-
jority of the collection could have remained with the museum while generously 
compensating creditors relative to the value of the entire DIA collection.
The best compromise would have involved selling only part of the collec-
tion.  The DIA could have survived as a cultural institution without some of its 
most valuable paintings and without many of the paintings that were kept in 
storage.  Moreover, benefactors committed to the museum’s vitality could have 
purchased whatever was auctioned from the DIA’s collection and gifted the 
works back to the museum.  Finally, the $816 million bailout plan that ultimate-
ly saved the DIA functioned much as a partial sale or an auction of the full col-
lection would have.  In other words, money raised to save the museum in effect 
gave creditors value from the collection, the same result if the museum had 
been liquidated.
117. Supra Part II.
